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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs against the defen-
dant for damages as a result of personal injuries and 
property damage sustained by the plaintiffs as a re-
sult of an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of the instant case was held on the 18th 
and 19th days of June, 1969, in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County before the Honorable Marcellus 
K. Snow, with a jury. On June 19, 1969, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of defendant and against 
the plaintiffs for no cause of action. Subsequently, 
the plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial, which 
motion was denied on August 18, 1969. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the order of the 
court below denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the appellants' state-
ment of the facts, but there are additional facts which 
were not set out in appellants' brief and which are 
pertinent to the issues. 
The car driven by 'the defendant was a new car, 
having been purchased in July of 1967 (R. 105), and 
was driven only around town for the three-month 
period up to the time of the accident (R. 129). 
During the course of the morning's drive prior 
to the accident the brakes squeaked and grabbed 
somewhat, but they stopped the car ( R. 109). The 
defendant thought that they must be getting moisture 
in them, but didn't give it a second thought because 
it was a new car ( R. 115). The brakes had always 
functioned all right before, and although she thought 
the moisture might be having some effect on them, 
she did not know that 'the rain would affect the brakes 
so that they would fail in the manner that they did 
(R. 116). 
Upon approaching the intersection when defen· 
dant saw plaintiffs' vehicle stopped at the semaphore, 
she let off on the accelerator and started to slow 
down. Miss Patrakis estimated that she had slowed 
down to 20 miles per hour when she was about 150 
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fl'd from the intel'section (R. 108). She applied her 
brakes lightly at first, and when she felt she was close 
enough, at about 75 feet from the plaintiff's car, she 
:1pplied them harder. She was surprised and stunned 
when the brakes did not work, and attempted to apply 
tlw foot emergency brake in order to avoid hitting 
the µlain tiffs' car ( R. 112). 
In her conversation with the investigating offi-
cer the defendant told him about the brakes, how they 
:1queaked and failed to work (R. 111), and Mr. Keller 
:Jso testified he heard her tell the officer the brakes 
didn't work. 
After the officer had completed his investiga-
tion he had the defendant pump the brakes on her 
\'ehicle, and then allowed her to drive home. The de-
fendant testified that she did not think the officer 
would have let her drive if there had been any ques-
tion about the safety of her doing so (R. 118). 
On the Monday following the accident Mr. Patrak-
is took the car to a mechanic, where the brakes were 
ehecked and found to be all right (R. 130). 
ARGUMENT 
THE "BRAKE FAIL URE" INSTRUCTIONS 
WERE A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE 
LAW AND WERE WARRANTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE; TH E RE F 0 R E, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Aftel' the evidence was in, the trial judge gave 
1 hti following jury instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
An automobile driver who has no notice 
of faulty brakes and could not discover the de. 
feet through the exercise of reasonable care is 
not responsible for any damage caused by 
brake failure. · 
If a driver knows or should know of such 
a defect; however, and takes no precautionary 
measures, he is liable for the consequences. · 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
You are instructed that in this case de-
fendant claims a defense of faulty brakes. The 
defendant has the burden of proving tha:t the 
brakes were, in fact, faulty, that defendant 
had no notice of the fact that they were faulty 
or could not have reasonably anticipated that 
the brakes would or might not be effective in 
slowing or stopping her vehicle under all of the 
circumstances and conditions which then and 
there existed. 
The statement of the law set forth in Instruc-
tions 9 and 10 is correct, and this is established in 
the case of White vs. Pinney, 99 Ut. 484, 108 P.2d 
249 (1940). 
Appellant has conceded that the instructions are 
a correct statement of the law, but is arguing that 
there was no evidence to support a theory of the case 
which would warrant the instructions. More specific-
ally, appellant contends that there must be some evi-
dence of a defective condition in the brakes in order 
for the "brake failure" instructions to be given, and 
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asserts that defendant introduced no evidence sup-
porting a defective condition. 
Respondent submits that the instructions were 
properly given, as there was sufficient evidence to 
;-;upport the defendant's theory of the case. The de-
fense was based on a sudden brake failure caused by 
wet brake linings. The defendant was alone in the 
car; therefore, the defense offered the only evidence 
available to support its theory of the case, the sworn 
testimony of the defendant: 
Q. What happened when you applied yom 
brakes? 
A. Well, as you know, the way people usually 
drive, I slowed down. I let off the acceler-
ator. I went to step on the brakes, first 
slightly, in order just to slow me down 
and I got no reaction. I stepped on them 
harder, and there was still nothing there. 
And I believe I was just surprised, kind 
of stunned that they weren't taking. And 
from there I leaned forward and with my 
left foot I tried stepping on the emergency 
brake, and there just- there wasn't time. 
(R. 108). 
It is evident that the jury believed the defen-
dant's testimony regarding the sudden brake failure, 
and in view of Instruction No. 10, the jury determin-
ed that Miss Patrakis could not have reasonably an-
ticipated that the brakes would fail under those cir-
cumstances. Although the defendant testified that 
the brakes had squeaked and somewhat grabbed 
while she was running her errands prior to the acci-
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dent, this was no indication that her brakes would 
fail as they did. It was a question for the jury wheth-
er she was put on notice that her brakes would fail. 
The evidence was clear that the defendant applied her 
brakes soon enough to have stopped in time even in 
the rain. She testified that she applied the brakes 
lightly at about 150 feet and harder at 75 feet with 
her vehicle going about 20 miles per hour at the time. 
Appellant points out the fact that the 
were checked by a garage on the Monday following 
the accident and found to be in perfect working order, 
and infers that this is evidence that the brakes were 
not defective at the time of the accident. It is common 
knowledge that wet brake linings will dry out. The 
witnesses testified that they were at the scene of the 
accident for 45 minutes to an hour (R. 111) and dur-
ing this period the brakes would have an opportunity 
to dry out. The investigating officer had Miss Pa-
trakis pump the brakes and then allowed her to drin 
home; therefore, the officer was aware of the fact 
that wet brakes will dry out. In any event, the brakes 
would be dry by the Monday following the accident 
when they were inspected by the mechanic. The only 
available evidence to show whether the brakes were 
defective at the time of the accident was the testi-
mony of the defendant. This evidence was offered by 
the defense, and it was believed by the jury. The only 
way one could probably get additional proof that wet 
brakes caused the accident would be if a service sta-
tion or garage were immediately adjacent to the scene 
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,if the accident and the car was taken in for an im-
mediate inspection. 
Appellant has cited the case of Woods vs. Good-
M'il, 55 ·wash. 2d 687, 349 P. 2d 731 (1960) as auth-
ority for the proposition that "brake failure" instruc-
t ions are improper in any case other than failure due 
to clef ective design or construction. The Woods case 
i1ffolved a brake "failure" due to the fact that the 
motor was not running when the defendant applied 
the power brakes. The court charged the defendant 
with knowledge that, when the motor was not run-
ning, the brakes would not function. 
In holding that it was prejudicial error to give 
the "brake failure" instructions under that fact sit-
uation, the court ruled that a driver has a duty to be 
sufficiently informed as to the operation and mechan-
ism of her automobile. 
The instructions were prejudicial because 
thereby the jury were permitted to exculpate 
the respondent from liability, if they found she 
did not know that which she is charged in law 
with knowing. 349 P. 2d at 734. 
The Woods case is clearly distinguishable on its 
facts. While the driver of an automobile may be 
charged with the knowledge that the power brakes 
on her car will not function when the motor is not 
running, this is a far different matter than ex-
tent the braking efficiency of 'l new car might be af-
fected by rainy weather. 
Instruction No. 10 placec the burden of proof 
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upon the defendant 'to show that she "could not have 
reasonably anticipated that the brakes would or 
might not be effective in slowing or stopping her ve-
hicle under all of the circumstances and conditions 
which then and there existed." This was a heavy bur-
den of proof, yet after all the evidence was in, the 
jury was satisfied that Miss Patrakis could not have 
reasonably anticipated her brakes would fail as they 
did. 
The question was properly submitted to the jury. 
As stated in 10 A Blashfield Automobiles 481, the 
general rule applicable to the case at hand is as fol-
lows: 
Under proper allegations, the question of 
defendant's negligence in regard to the condi-
tion and operating of brakes should generally 
be submitted to the jury. 
In Parker vs. Bridgeport Mach. Co., 91 S. W. 2d 
807 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936), one of the questions was 
whether the defendant was negligent in driving his 
car while the brakes were frozen. The court consid-
ered the possible argument that it was inconsistent 
for the jury to find that the defendant was not neg-
ligent on any of the grounds alleged in the plaintiff's 
petition, and also to find that the accident was un-
avoidable. The jury had found that the brakes were 
frozen, yet still brought in a finding of unavoidable 
accident. The court did not feel that these findings 
were inconsistent . 
. . . notwithstanding the fact that in the 
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stress of weather which overtook the driver of 
defendant's car as he traveled along the road-
way and shortly before he reached the place 
of the collision the brakes on his car became 
frozen or partially frozen so as to prevent his 
stopping his car quickly, the jury was justified 
in finding that he was not negligent under all 
of the circumstances disclosed by the record in 
proceeding across the intersection with his 
brakes in this condition. 91 S. W. 2d at 809. 
Further support is found in Amelsburg vs. Lun-
ning, 14 N. W. 2d 680 (Iowa, 1944), which was bas-
ed on a fact situation very similar 'to the case at hand. 
The plaintiff sought damages for personal in-
juries resulting from a collision at a road intersec-
tion. The evidence showed that the defendant had 
driven his car through slush and muddy water the 
day before the collision which, by reason of freezing 
weather, caused the brakes to freeze. On the day of 
the accident the defendant had driven only a short 
distance before he reached the intersection where the 
accident occurred, and had had no cause to use the 
brakes. 
The court held that whether the defendant was 
negligent in failing to discover the condition of the 
brakes was a question for the jury, not a question of 
law for the court. 
The court referred to the general rule as stated 
in 5 Am. J ur. 643, §252 : 
. . . where the brakes of an automobile 
have previously functioned properly, but sud-
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denly fail to respond, their failure does nu1 
render the owner guilty of negligence ... un: 
less he had knowledge of the defective condi-
tion. 
Respondent submits that the question whether 
Miss Patrakis was negligent in regard to the concli-
tion and operation of her brakes was a question fur 
the jury. Furthermore, Instructions 9 and 10 advised 
the jury of the law applicable to the case; and, if any 
thing, were favorable to the plaintiff in that they im-
posed a heavy burden of proof on the defendant. 
Appellant contends that to allow the"brake fail-
ure" instructions to be given was tantamount to gi\'-
ing an "unavoidable accident" instruction which was 
not warranted by the facts of the case. If appellant\ 
logic were followed to a conclusion, in every case in 
which the court instructs the jury that unless the)· 
find negligence, the defendant is not liable, one could 
say that the court has given the jury an instruction 
that is tantamount to an "unavoidable accident" in-
struction. In every case in which the defendant is no; 
guilty of negligence the jury, in effect, makes a find-
ing that it was unavoidable as to the defendant. 
In any event, the "unavoidable accident" in-
struction which the Utah Supreme Court says shouk: 
be given with caution and only where the evidencr 
would justify it, was not given in this case. Thus tl1 1 
problem of duplicity was not present. The reason tht 
"unavoidable accident" instruction has come unclt 1 
ffre is that: 
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It compels the plaintiff to assume the 
double burden of convincing the jury, first, 
that the defendant was negligent and, second, 
that there was no unavoidable accident. Wood-
ho11se vs. Johnson, 20 Ut. 2d 210, 436 P. 2d 
442, 453 (1968) (dissenting opinion) 
Instructions 9 and 10 placed no such burden 
upon the plaintiff in this case. If anything, the defen-
dant under the unusually heavy burden of proving 
that she could not have reasonably anticipated that 
her brakes might fail as they did. It is apparent that 
the defendant sustained her burden of proof to the 
satisfaction of the jury. 
Appellant has cited Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 20 
Ut. 2d 210, 436 P. 2d 442 ( 1968), and there is some 
pertinent language from the majority decision in 
that case. 
Ferreting the wheat from the chaff in the 
plethora of requests from the contesting par-
ties and 'fashioning instructions covering all 
aspects of such a case in a manner fair to both 
sides poses such a problem for the trial judge 
that losing counsel can usually point to some 
claimed error to use as a basis for argument 
that the jury must have been misguided be-
cause he did not win. 
* * * 
This court has many times given expres-
sion to the importance of safeguarding the 
right of trial by jury and the solidarity that 
should be accorded a verdict after the parties 
have been given a fair trial. Even-handed jus-
tice requires that this apply to all alike: To de-
ll 
fendant, as well as to plaintiffs. 436 P. 2d at 
446 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the instructions were 
as favorable for plaintiffs as could be expected in 
connection with setting out the law and the duties of 
a driver with respect to brakes; that there was suf. 
ficient evidence to support the contention that the 
defendant's brakes were defective at the time of the 
accident; that the question whether defendant was 
negligent was properly submitted to the jury; and, 
therefore, the decision of the trial court denying 
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. L. SUMMERHAYS of 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant r}and1esW 
